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Beyond Random Assignment:
Credible Inference and Extrapolation
in Dynamic Economies
CHRISTOPHER A. HENNESSY and ILYA A. STREBULAEV∗
ABSTRACT
We derive analytical relationships between shock responses and theory-implied causal effects (com-
parative statics) in dynamic settings with linear profits and linear-quadratic stock accumulation
costs. For permanent profitability shocks, responses can have incorrect signs, undershoot, or over-
shoot depending on the size and sign of realized changes. For profitability shocks that are i.i.d.,
uniformly distributed, binary, or unanticipated and temporary, there is attenuation bias, which
exceeds 50% under plausible parameterizations. We derive a novel sufficient condition for prof-
itability shock responses to equal causal effects: martingale profitability. We establish a battery of
sufficient conditions for correct sign estimation, including stochastic monotonicity. Simple extrap-
olation/error correction formulae are presented.
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In applied microeconomics fields such as corporate finance, theory-implied causal effects are gen-
erally derived using comparative statics. For instance, as Heckman (2000) writes, “Comparative
statics exercises formalize Marshall’s notion of a ceteris paribus change which is what economists
mean by a causal effect.” Athey, Milgrom, and Roberts (1998) similarly observe that “most of the
testable implications of economic theory are comparative static predictions.” In assessing implica-
tions of tradeoff theory, Welch (2010) states that “The comparative statics analysis are simple and
obvious: The firm should have more debt if the interest rate is higher, if the corporate tax rate is
higher, and the cost of distress is lower.”
The objective of much econometric work is to empirically estimate signs and magnitudes of
causal effects. The estimates can be compared to theory-predicted causal effects and can also be
used to inform welfare analysis. Theories predicting incorrect signs are informally referred to as
“falsified,” while those with small estimated causal effects are informally referred to as “second-
order.” Small empirical estimates of causal effects have been used to argue that government-induced
behavior distortions generate small deadweight losses (see, for example, Slemrod (1990) and Aaron
(1990)).
In their textbook, Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion (MHE here-
after), Angrist and Pischke (2009) imply that the primary barrier to correct empirical estimation
of causal effects is endogeneity and selection bias: “The goal of most empirical research is to over-
come selection bias, and therefore to have something to say about the causal effect of a variable.”
They then state that “A principle that guides our discussion is that most of the estimators in
common use have a simple interpretation that is not heavily model dependent.” The perceived
conjunction of credibility and simplicity of interpretation has led to a surge in the popularity of
the MHE methodology.
A limitation of the MHE methodology in practice, however, is that it is silent on how to ad-
dress the inherent complications arising from dynamic uncertainty. Indeed, while there is much
discussion about shock exogeneity, there is little discussion, let alone formal estimation, of the data-
generating process responsible for the exploited shocks. Moreover, there are few formal attempts
to map observed shock responses back to theory-implied causal effects (theory testing), extrapolate
shock responses across stochastic environments (external validity), or estimate causal parameters
entering welfare calculations. In some cases, researchers may have a prior suggesting that dynamic
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uncertainty is a second-order concern. In other cases, researchers are aware that inference is some-
how clouded, but do not know the exact nature of the problems or how to address them at an
operational level without resorting to full-scale structural estimation.
Issues arising from dynamic uncertainty are avoided if one claims that an exploited shock is
unanticipated and permanent. However, this common assumption suffers from a host of problems.
First, confining attention to truly rare events means that timely evidence is unlikely to exist.
Second, the notion that an exploited shock is permanent generally contradicts the underlying
motivation for empirical work, namely, to help optimize policy in the future and/or to forecast
responses to future shocks. Third, inspection of time series for many policy variables such as the
effective corporate tax rate and the real minimum wage reveals changes to be the norm, not the
exception. Finally, there is a fundamental difference between shocks never occurring and shocks
taking place infrequently, say, once a decade in expectation. In the latter case, the arrival of a
shock today might be casually treated as a “surprise.” Nevertheless, as we show, the bias arising
from expectations in such cases can still be quite large.
What special challenges does dynamic uncertainty pose for researchers performing shock-based
inference, how important are they, and what can be done to overcome them without resorting to
full-scale structural estimation? To address these questions, we develop a canonical model of firm
decision-making flexible enough to capture a broad range of commonly studied dependent variables
and alternative causal theories. In our baseline model, a firm dynamically accumulates a (divisible)
stock, such as capital, inventories, patents, debt, cash, or employees, that provides a (linear) flow
of benefits over time while facing (linear-quadratic) accumulation costs.
Using the model as our laboratory, we consider an econometrician whose objective is to infer
whether the shock responses she observes are consistent with the theory-implied causal effects.
Fortunately, we know the theory-implied causal effects, which we compute using comparative stat-
ics. In contrast, our econometrician is forced to rely upon shock responses for inference. Critically,
however, we consider a setting in which the endogeneity challenges to which MHE devotes exclusive
attention are a non issue. Specifically, we assume that shocks take the form of exogenous Markov
chain transitions. Examining the relationship between theory-implied causal effects and shock re-
sponses in this laboratory allows us to assess whether the MHE tool kit suffices for inference of
theory-implied causal effects in dynamic settings.
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Our primary focus is on inference when the econometrician exploits shocks that bring about
changes in the flow of periodic benefits generated by the stock, for example, shocks to taxes,
regulations, competition, productivity, input prices, or yields on cash/debt. To begin, we derive a
set of tractable analytical formulae relating shock responses to theory-implied causal effects. Each
formula can be used to perform back-of-the-envelope bias calculations or inverted to correct for
bias.
The bias formulae reveal troubling implications. If the shock is, say, binary, then shock responses
can represent severely downward-biased estimates of theory-implied causal effects. For example,
under our baseline parameterization, attenuation bias exceeds one-half the causal effect if the shock
probability exceeds just 5.26%. Worse still, shock responses can be biased upwards and even have
signs opposite to that of the causal effect. For example, if a shock is permanent, the shock response
will overshoot the causal effect if the realized change is opposite in sign to the expected change.
Intuitively, objectively good (bad) news becomes great (terrible) news if bad (good) news was
expected. Even worse still, the shock response will have the wrong sign if the realized change is
sufficiently small relative to the expected change. Intuitively, objectively good (bad) news becomes
bad (good) news if even better (worse) news was expected.
The problems that these examples highlight are not theoretical curiosities. To illustrate, we
use the time series of historical effective tax rates to estimate a Markov chain approximating
the data-generating process confronting corporations. We then analytically compare simulated
shock responses to theory-implied causal effects. Under our baseline parameterization, we find that
attenuation bias is severe, with shock responses generally falling just below one-half the theory-
implied causal effect. Intuitively, real-world transience in tax rates makes firms much less responsive
to shocks than would be the case if the shocks were unanticipated and permanent. Such severe
magnitude bias has important policy implications. After all, as we show, the same 50% attenuation
bias exhibited by shock responses carries over directly to estimated tax elasticity and excess burden
calculations.
To make sense of shock responses, mapping them back to theory-implied causal effects or ex-
trapolating them, one must move beyond exogeneity by estimating the stochastic process for the
shocks (that is, the “data-generating process”). With this estimation accomplished, we show ana-
lytically how theory-implied causal effects can be recovered from shock responses, so that empirical
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evidence can speak directly to theoretical predictions or fed directly into welfare calculations. We
also show how shock responses can be extrapolated within and across data-generating processes to
overcome the challenge that dynamic uncertainty poses to external validity.
In some circumstances the econometrician will be unable to estimate the underlying data-
generating process but will want to argue that her setting satisfies some identifying assumption
that guarantees equality of shock responses and causal effects. As we show, one valid identify-
ing assumption is that all state-contingent shock probabilities are infinitesimal, that is, shocks are
almost perfectly unanticipated and permanent. However, we also show that under the classical
linear-quadratic technology, another valid identifying assumption is that the flow of benefits pro-
vided by the stock be a martingale. In some applied settings, this may be viewed as a more plausible
identifying assumption since a stochastic process can change frequently and still be a martingale.
In some cases, an empiricist will set a lower bar and aim to at least avoid incorrect estimation of
causal effect signs. Here we derive a battery of sign identification assumptions that can be invoked:
i.i.d. shocks, unanticipated temporary shocks, binary shocks, transitory uniformly distributed
shocks, a permanent change opposite in sign to the expected change, a permanent change equal in
sign but with absolute value exceeding the expected change, or stochastic monotonicity. We note
that the latter – stochastic monotonicity – may be a reasonable sign identification assumption to
invoke in many applied settings as an increase in the causal variable today implies a first-order
stochastic dominant shift in the variable at all future dates.
We also examine shocks to the stock variable price and shocks to adjustment costs. Here we find
that under the linear-quadratic technology, measured shock responses are equal to theory-implied
causal effects regardless of the underlying stochastic process. However, this finding is due to a
special property of the linear-quadratic technology: the amount of stock accumulated this period
has no effect on the feasibility, cost, or benefit flow arising from accumulation in future periods.
To illustrate, in extensions we consider the relationship between shock responses and causal
effects under alternative technologies. As discussed above, with linear benefits and quadratic ad-
justment costs, the stochastic process matters for interpreting benefit shocks but not for interpreting
shocks to the price of the stock variable. We show that if the firm instead faces concave benefits
to the stock variable with zero adjustment cost, these conclusions are reversed. In particular,
in this case the stochastic process for the shocks is irrelevant for interpreting the benefit shocks
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but critical for interpreting the price shocks. Thus, our analysis shows that correctly interpreting
shock responses requires making joint assumptions about underlying stochastic processes and real
technologies, in addition to the traditional orthogonality assumption.
We turn now to related literature. Bowen, Frésard, and Taillard (2016) find that in the top-three
finance journals, the share of empirical corporate finance papers using what they term “identification
technologies” has risen from roughly 0% in the late 1980s to over 50% by 2012, with 126 published
papers using difference-in-difference techniques applied to quasi-natural experiments.
The most common identification technologies are “shock-based,” with inferences being drawn
from responses to changes in causal variables. For example, an extensive literature studies capital
structure responses to tax code changes.1 Shock-based inference is also pervasive, and increasing,
in corporate governance research. In an exhaustive analysis, Atanasov and Black (2016) document
that use of shock-based designs approximately doubled from 4% to 11% of empirical governance
papers between the 2001–2006 and the 2007–2011 periods. As surveyed by Karpoff and Wittry
(2015), changes in state-level anti-takeover laws are often exploited as a source of quasi-exogenous
variation in governance pressure.2 As a final example, shock-based inference is common in studying
real investment, which, along with leverage, is perhaps the most commonly studied dependent
variable in empirical corporate finance.3
Our analysis is in the spirit of Lucas (1976), who highlights the perils of extrapolating macro-
econometric evidence across policy rules. Our focus is on the inadequacy of the random assignment
assumption taken in isolation. Naturally, Lucas does not analyze the relationship between treatment
responses under dynamic random assignment and theory-implied causal effects, derive sufficient
conditions for correct identification of causal effect signs and magnitudes, or derive formulae for
error correction and extrapolation.
Abel (1982) analyzes the effects of permanent versus temporary tax policies with no policy
variable uncertainty. Specifically, he assumes, in potential violation of rational expectations, that
1See Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1990, 1997), Givoly et al. (1992), Chetty and Saez (2004), Hanlon and Joopes
(2014), Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), Schepens (2016), and Schandlbauer (2017).
2See Garvey and Hanka (1999).
3See Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994), Yagan (2015), Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003), Atanassov
(2013), Greenstone (2002), Alesina et al. (2005), Kilian (2008), Gan (2007), Chaney et al. (2012), Banerjee et al.
(2015), Crepon et al. (2015), and Mukherjee, Singh, and Zaldokas (2017).
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the policy change is completely unanticipated, with policy being binary and deterministic after the
complete surprise policy change. Incorporating rational expectations, as well as the probability
distribution of shocks, is essential for our results. House and Shapiro (2008) also ignore uncertainty
and present response approximations assuming arbitrarily short-lived policy changes. In their
setting, the shadow value of capital is left unchanged by policy changes. In contrast, we analyze the
behavior of shadow values and optimal accumulation, allowing for policy uncertainty and expected
regime lives of arbitrary duration.
Auerbach (1986) and Auerbach and Hines (1988) present investment Euler equations under
stochastic tax rates. Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994) estimate adjustment cost parameters
based on tax experiments. They assume that each tax change is a complete surprise and is viewed
as being permanent, in violation of rational expectations. Hassett and Metcalf (1999) present a real
options model with a one-time investment that they use to assess whether uncertainty regarding tax
credits encourages investment. Gourio and Miao (2008) numerically compare effects of permanent
and temporary dividend tax cuts.
The paper closest to our own is Keane and Wolpin (2002). One of the underlying messages of
the two papers is similar, with both stressing the need to account for dynamics and uncertainty
in statistical inference. However, there are also numerous important differences. First, in terms
of context, they analyze a granular dynamic model of contraceptive use and welfare participation,
while we offer a more general analysis of the effect of dynamic uncertainty on shadow values, the key
determinant of optimal accumulation of a broad array of commonly studied stock variables. Sec-
ond, they offer numerical solutions featuring polynomial approximations, while we present analytic
solutions amenable to direct analysis. Third, and related to the second point, we present simple
analytic expressions for biases, and bias probabilities, stated in terms of expectations and shock
probabilities, while they do not address this question. Finally, we present necessary and sufficient
conditions for correct signs and/or magnitudes, while again they do not address this question.
Our work is in the spirit of Chetty (2012), who also attempts to straddle reduced-form and
structural work. Writing that “The identification of structural parameters of stylized models is
one of the central tasks of applied economics,” Chetty (2012) examines how to recover structural
elasticity parameters if there are transaction costs or inattention. In this paper, we instead develop
a model to understand and correct empirical estimates derived from random assignment in dynamic
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settings, with recovery of adjustment cost parameters being an interim step.
Our paper is related to but distinct from the literature contesting the external validity of
estimates derived from instrumental variables, for example, Heckman (1997) and Deaton (2010).
To begin, in the setting we consider, there is absolutely no instrumentation and by construction
no possibility of self-selection, so the oft-discussed issues surrounding the correct interpretation of
the local average treatment effect (LATE) are extraneous. Second, issues concerning heterogeneous
treatment effects are also extraneous to our analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the economic setting. Sec-
tion II derives the relationship between shock responses and theory-implied causal effects. Section
III presents identifying assumptions. Section IV shows how shock responses can be extrapolated.
Section V presents a numerical example. Section VI considers alternatives to the linear-quadratic
technology. Section VII concludes.
I. Theory and Models
Our objective is to develop an analytical framework that allows researchers to both understand
and bridge the gap between underlying theories and empirical tests of those theories that rely on
exogenous time-series variation in variables for the purpose of causal identification.
We begin by writing down a classical linear-quadratic model of how a firm optimally accumulates
a stock variable over time. As demonstrated below, this model is general and flexible enough to
encompass a broad set of causal theories and dependent variables. With the model in-hand, we
perform comparative statics with respect to its causal parameters.4 We thus mimic the methodology
that theorists and empiricists generally rely upon when attempting to formally flush out the testable
implications of underlying theories. We next develop a companion model that captures the same
underlying theoretical trade-offs as the original model, but mimics the real-world data-generating
process exploited by the econometrician.
The body of the paper presents only those equations necessary for the empirical implications.
Formal solutions, including derivation of the value function, are relegated to the Appendix.
4As in Heckman (2000), a “causal parameter” is a model parameter whose effect on outcomes we would like to
predict. Causal parameters are a subset of a model’s structural parameters.
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A. Theory-Implied Causal Effects
This subsection presents a general linear-quadratic model of optimal accumulation of a stock
variable.5 The stock variable provides a linear benefit flow, and the firm faces linear-quadratic costs
of adjusting the stock.
In the interest of generality, we treat the model’s benefit and cost parameters as primitives.
Depending on the theory being considered, alternative factors would lead to changes in these
parameters. For example, in tax-based theories of investment and financial structure, a higher
corporate tax rate is associated with a lower flow of benefits from the accumulation of real and
financial assets. To take another example, in theories emphasizing transaction costs, streamlining
the bond flotation process through shelf-registration would be associated with lower costs to ad-
justing debt stocks. Similarly, labor market deregulation would be associated with lower costs to
adjusting the number of employees.
Time is discrete and horizons are infinite. Agents are risk-neutral and discount at rate r > 0.
The firm accumulates a stock s that decays at rate δ ≥ 0. The firm starts the current period
with stock s and receives an end-of-period net after-tax benefit inflow equal to bs′, where s′ is the
end-of-period stock and b > 0. Notice that corporate saving and borrowing are subsumed here,
with s > 0 corresponding to a positive liquid asset balance and s < 0 corresponding to debt.
The firm can buy and sell the stock variable at price p. The variable a denotes accumulation.
The law of motion for the stock variable is
s′ = (1− δ)s+ a. (1)
We do not impose a nonnegativity constraint on the stock. Indeed, for the model to accom-
modate corporate borrowing, we must admit s < 0. A nonnegative steady-state stock can be
guaranteed by imposing p ≤ b/(r + δ). Alternatively, one can simply assume that the initial stock
held by the firm is arbitrarily large.
The stock variable price p represents the second causal parameter in the model. Finally, there
are quadratic costs to adjusting the stock equal to a2/2ξ. Here, ξ > 0 is the third and final causal
5Hennessy and Strebulaev (2015) show how geometric Brownian motion stocks are readily incorporated with small
modifications to the formulas. For simplicity we abstract from standard errors but note that magnitude bias can
bring about sign reversals accounting for standard errors.
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parameter in the model, capturing the ease of adjusting the stock. Importantly, this linear-quadratic
framework can be understood as an implicit formal foundation for much empirical work since, as
shown below, it maps into the classical linear causal effects econometric model. We consider a more
general class of cost functions as an extension in Section VI.
A wide range of dependent variables is subsumed in this model. The most obvious interpretation
of the stock variable is that it represents tangible or intangible capital, for example, PPE, patents,
brand value, or reputation. Alternatively, s can represent a buffer stock of net working capital, such
as cash or inventories that provide convenience yields. One can think of a negative value of s as
representing default-free debt. As a final example, following Hammermesh (1989), s can represent
the number of employees.
Despite its simplicity, a broad range of real-world causal effects can be captured by this model.
Consider first causal factors that change the benefit inflow b. Changes in taxes and regulations
change profits per unit of capital. Demand and supply shocks change flexible input prices and
thereby affect operating profits.6 Consider next just some of the causal factors that can change
the stock price p, as well as the ease of stock adjustment ξ. Tariffs, regulation, and competition
change equilibrium prices of capital goods. The government affects the net price of capital through
investment tax credits and R&D tax credits. The imposition of a zoning restriction changes the
price of real estate, as do natural disasters. Labor market regulations affect the ease (ξ) of hiring
and firing employees, and securities market regulations affect the ease of adjusting debt stocks.
At each point in time, it is optimal for the firm to increase accumulation up to the point that
the marginal value of the stock variable, call it q, is just equal to the marginal cost. Equating
marginal benefits and costs we have
q = p+ ξ−1a∗∗ ⇒ a∗∗ = ξ(q − p). (2)
Notice that in equation (2) we use double stars to denote the optimal policy obtained in the
present setting. We will use this notation to consider the effects of changes in the causal parameter
vector (b, p, ξ) by way of standard comparative statics analysis.
Accounting for the fact that the stock variable decays at rate δ, the Gordon growth formula can
6See Abel and Eberly (1994) for calculations.
10
A
cc
ep
te
d
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
be used to pin down the present value of the flow of benefits. Anticipating, in the next subsection
we let b be a Markov process with i indexing the state. With this in mind, we write
b = bi ⇒ q =
bi
r + δ
≡ qi∞. (3)
In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the variable qi∞ as permanent q. This variable measures
the shadow value of a unit of the stock variable if the benefit inflow variable is permanently fixed
at bi.
The two preceding equations imply that the optimal accumulation policy is
a∗∗(b, p, ξ) = ξ
[
b
r + δ
− p
]
. (4)
We then obtain the following theory-implied causal effects:
∂a∗∗(b, p, ξ)
∂p
= −ξ (5)
∂a∗∗(b, p, ξ)
∂ξ
=
b
r + δ
− p
∂a∗∗(b, p, ξ)
∂b
=
ξ
r + δ
.
Intuitively, the theory here predicts that optimal stock accumulation is decreasing in the price
p of the stock, increasing (decreasing) in the efficiency of stock adjustments when it is optimal to
increase (decrease) the stock, and increasing in the periodic benefit flow b.
In the case of discrete changes, as opposed to infinitesimal changes, causal effects are evaluated
by computing the difference between optimal policies evaluated at different values of the causal
parameters. We have the following definition of a discrete causal effect associated with a move
from causal parameter vector i to causal parameter vector j:
CEij ≡ a∗∗(bj , pj , ξj)− a∗∗(bi, pi, ξi). (6)
Substituting the optimal policies from equation (4) into the preceding equation, we obtain the
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following theory-implied causal effects:
p : CEpij = −ξ(pj − pi) (7)
ξ : CEξij =
(
b
r + δ
− p
)
(ξj − ξi).
b : CEbij = ξ
(
bj − bi
r + δ
)
.
Alternatively, following Heckman (2000), the fact that the causal effects are linear (equation (5))
implies that the preceding expressions for discrete causal effects can be computed by multiplying
partial derivatives by the contemplated discrete change in causal parameters.
The steady-state stock here, call it s∗∗, is such that optimal periodic accumulation is just
sufficient to cover depreciation on the stock. Thus
s∗∗ =
a∗∗
δ
⇒ ∆s∗∗ = ∆a
∗∗
δ
. (8)
Even though there are no shocks here, there are dynamics. Specifically, if the stock is initially
below (above) s∗∗, the stock will increase (decrease) since accumulation is greater (less) than de-
preciation. Finally, notice that the comparative static properties of the flow variable a∗∗ carry over
to the stock variable s∗∗, being scaled by δ−1. Thus, under the linear-quadratic technology, causal
effects are linear whether they are expressed in terms of the flow variable (a∗∗) or the steady-state
stock value (s∗∗).
B. Shocks and Firm Decisions
We consider now a companion economy in which the underlying theoretical trade-off is exactly
as in the preceding subsection: the optimal stock accumulation of the firm weighs linear-quadratic
accumulation costs against the periodic benefit inflow b provided by the stock. However, we con-
struct this companion economy to mimic the data-generating process actually being exploited by
the econometrician who performs shock-based inference. One can think of the econometrician as
observing firms before and after an exogenous shock, or as comparing shocked firms with otherwise
identical nonshocked firms.
By construction, we strip our laboratory economy of selection and endogeneity bias. In partic-
ular, the evolution of the three causal variables b, p, and ξ is governed by an exogenous N -state
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Markov chain. The shocks are also clean in the sense that only one of the three causal variables
is changing over time, with the other two variables assumed to be constant. This ensures that
inferences regarding firm responsiveness to a specific causal variable cannot be clouded by changes
in some other causal variable.
Let state 1 denote the best state in the sense of being associated with the highest benefit inflow,
highest stock adjustment efficiency, and lowest stock variable price:
b1 ≥ ... ≥ bN (9)
ξ1 ≥ ... ≥ ξN
p1 ≤ ... ≤ pN .
When considering experiments involving shocks to a given causal variable, say b, there will be N
strict inequalities for that variable, for example, b1 > ... > bN , and N equalities for the remaining
two variables that are then assumed to be constant over time.
The timing convention is as follows. If the current (beginning-of-period) state is i, then the firm
makes its current accumulation decision knowing that the price of the stock is pi, the ease of stock
adjustment is ξi, and the end-of-period benefit inflow is bis
′, where s′ reflects the current period’s
accumulation decision in accordance with equation (1). Further, if the current state is i, then with
probability Λi there will be a shock causing the state to be different at the start of the next period.
Finally, the conditional probability of a transition to state j, given that a transitional shock out of
state i has taken place, is denoted Πij , with Πii = 0.
Since the underlying theory is assumed to be the same as in the preceding subsection, the optimal
accumulation policy again equates the marginal value of the stock variable with the marginal cost of
accumulation. However, we must now depart from equation (2) and account for state-contingency
in the marginal stock value, stock price, and efficiency of stock adjustment. If the current state is
i, then the optimal state-contingent accumulation policy, call it a∗i , solves
qi = pi + ξ
−1
i a
∗
i ⇒ a∗i = ξi(qi − pi). (10)
Notice, that in equation (10), single stars are used to denote the optimal policy for a firm occupying
the same economy as the econometrician, an economy that features exogenous shocks to causal
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variables. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the variable qi as transient q since it measures
the value of a unit of the stock variable in an economy in which the benefit b is subject to shocks.
Consider now the marginal value of a unit of the stock variable if the current state is i. At the
end of the period, one unit of accumulation will generate a known benefit inflow bi. In addition,
1 − δ units of decayed stock will carry over to the subsequent period. However, the state in the
subsequent period is uncertain. With probability (1 − Λi) the state will not change and so each
unit of the decayed stock will have value qi. With probability ΛiΠij the state will change to j and
each unit of decayed stock will have value qj . It follows that state-by-state, the marginal value of
the stock satisfies
q1 =
(
1
1 + r
)
b1 + (1− δ)

(1− Λ1)q1 + Λ1
∑
j 6=1
Π1jqj



 (11)
...
qN =
(
1
1 + r
)
bN + (1− δ)

(1− ΛN )qN + ΛN
∑
j 6=N
ΠNjqj



 .
Equation (11) is a simple linear system. Solving it, we find that the marginal value of the stock
state-by-state is


q1
...
qN

 =
[
T−1
]


b1
...
bN

 , (12)
where T denotes the following augmented transition matrix :
T ≡


r + δ + (1− δ)Λ1 −(1− δ)Λ1Π12 ... −(1− δ)Λ1Π1N
−(1− δ)Λ2Π21 r + δ + (1− δ)Λ2 ... −(1− δ)Λ2Π2N
... ... ... ...
−(1− δ)ΛNΠN1 −(1− δ)ΛNΠN2 ... r + δ + (1− δ)ΛN


. (13)
Conveniently, the preceding linear system accounts for all shocks over time and also performs the
necessary discounting.
In the special case in which the benefit flow has only two possible values, equation (12) can be
written as
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qi =
bi
r + δ
+
(1− δ)Λi(bj − bi)
(r + δ)[r + δ + (1− δ)(Λi + Λj)]
. (14)
II. Shock Responses and Causal Effects
This section describes the relationship between shock responses and causal effects. Conveniently,
in contrast to the real-world environment confronting the econometrician, here we know the theory-
implied causal effects (equations (5) and(7)). Thus, we are able to determine the conditions under
which shock responses recover the sign and/or magnitude of the causal effects. Moreover, when
there is indeed a wedge, we are able to derive expressions that allow econometricians to back out
the causal effect implied by a measured shock response.
A. Defining Shock Responses
As discussed above, the econometrician occupies a stochastic economy in which the firm’s op-
timal state-contingent accumulation policy (a∗i ) is described by equation (10). The econometrician
then relies on observed shock responses for causal inference. The shock response associated with a
transition from state i to j is denoted by SRij . We thus have
SRij ≡ a∗j − a∗i . (15)
Substituting the optimal policies from equation (10) into the preceding equation, it follows that
the econometrician in the stochastic economy will observe the following respective shock responses:
p : SRpij = −ξ(pj − pi) (16)
ξ : SRξij = (q − p) (ξj − ξi) =
(
b
r + δ
− p
)
(ξj − ξi)
b : SRbij = ξ(qj − qi).
B. Inference: Shocks to Stock Variable Price and Adjustment Costs
It follows directly from equation (16) that the shock responses observed by the econometrician
are identical to the theory-implied causal effects (equation (7)) associated with changes in the
15
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causal parameters related to the stock price and the efficiency of stock adjustment. We thus have
the following result.
PROPOSITION 1: With exogenous changes in either the price p of the stock or exogenous changes
in stock adjustment costs (ξ), measured shock responses directly recover theory-implied causal effects
regardless of the underlying stochastic process.
To understand the preceding result, some points are worth noting. First, since benefit inflows
are, by assumption, linear in the stock variable, the amount of accumulation that the firm chooses
this period has no effect on the benefits provided by units of stock added in future periods. Second,
in contrast to a real-options setting, in a neoclassical setup such as ours, stock accumulation this
period has no effect on the feasibility of stock accumulation in future periods. Finally, since
accumulation costs are, by assumption, linear-quadratic in a, the amount of accumulation that
the firm chooses this period has no effect on the cost of accumulation in future periods.
In such an environment, the firm can behave myopically when it evaluates paying the stock
variable price or incurring adjustment costs. Thus, the law of motion for these variables becomes
irrelevant to the firm’s stock accumulation decision in the current period. By way of contrast, in
Section VI we show that the law of motion does indeed become relevant for the interpretation of
price shock responses if one instead considers a setting with concave benefits and zero adjustment
costs. Thus, the preceding proposition is best viewed as a potentially useful identifying assumption,
but one that relies on strong functional form assumptions.
C. Inference: Shocks to Intertemporal Benefit Flows
This subsection considers econometric inference in economies, in which there are shocks to the
benefit variable b.
To begin the formal analysis, we note that theory-implied causal effects (equation (7)) can be
recovered from observed shock responses provided one has estimated the law of motion for the
shocks. The following proposition provides the general mapping formula.
PROPOSITION 2: With exogenous shocks to the intertemporal benefit flow b, the ratio of causal
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effect to shock response is given by
CEbij
SRbij
=
ξ (∆q∞)
ξ (∆q)
=
(bj − bi)/(r + δ)
qj − qi
, (17)
where qi and qj are determined by the law of motion for shocks per equation (12).
Proposition 2 describes a general algorithm for recovering causal effects from measured shock
responses. Intuitively, to infer causal effects one must scale the observed shock response by the
ratio of the change in permanent q∞ (equation (3)) to the change in transient q (equation (12)).
The key message of the proposition is simple: articulating/estimating the underlying stochastic
process describing shocks is a necessary precursor for extracting their economic meaning. Section
V provides an example of how to make Proposition 2 operational in applied settings.
As reflected in the preceding proposition, under the posited linear-quadratic technology, the
adjustment cost parameter drops out of the bias ratio formula since both causal effects and shock
responses are multiples of ξ. However, rearranging terms in the proposition, we see that bias, if
measured as the difference between shock responses and causal effects, increases linearly in ξ.7 In
particular, rearranging terms in the preceding proposition yields
BIASbij ≡ SRbij − CEbij = ξ
[
(qj − qi)−
bj − bi
r + δ
]
. (18)
Intuitively, greater ease of stock adjustment (ξ) magnifies the bias associated with the wedge
between transient and permanent q.
Proposition 2 also sheds light on structural econometric work by Cummins, Hassett, and Hub-
bard (1994, CHH) who provide an estimate, call it ξ̂, of the ease of stock adjustment, which has
true value ξ. If the shock generating process were known, equation (12) could be used to solve for
the true shadow value of capital in each state. Exploiting equation (16), the true value of the ease
of adjustment parameter could then be inferred from an observed shock response by solving
ξ =
SRbij
qj − qi
. (19)
CHH impute shadow values of capital under the assumption that each tax change comes as a
complete surprise and is viewed as being permanent. That is, the shadow value of capital in
7Notice that transient q does not depend on ξ under the posited linear-quadratic technology.
17
A
cc
ep
te
d
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
equation (19) is treated as q∞ as defined in equation (3). From equations (17) and (19) it follows
that this imputation procedure delivers the parameter estimate
ξ̂ =
SRbij
qj∞ − qi∞
=
qj − qi
(bj − bi)/(r + δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
SR/CE
SRbij
qj − qi︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξ
=
(
SRbij
CEbij
)
× ξ. (20)
At an operational level, equation (20) illustrates how all of our results on the ratio of shock
responses to causal effects have a direct mapping to structural parameter inference. In particular,
the CHH imputation procedure yields biased estimates of the parameter ξ, capturing ease of stock
adjustment, precisely when shock responses yield biased estimates of theory-implied causal effects.
To see the practical implications, consider instances in which reduced-form approaches, relying
on shock responses, produce downward-biased estimates of causal effects (SR/CE ∈ (0, 1)). In
those same instances, structural approaches using the CHH imputation method would produce
downward-biased estimates of the ease of stock adjustment. Econometricians using the former
approach erroneously conclude that the underlying causal theory is “second-order” while structural
econometricians erroneously conclude that stock adjustment is “sluggish” due to extremely high
adjustment costs.
In many instances, the econometrician does not have sufficient information to utilize Proposition
2, which requires knowledge or estimation of the stochastic process for the shocks. Nevertheless,
the econometrician may have a rough sense of the data-generating process. Our objective in the
remainder of this section is to provide useful takeaways in such settings. To begin, suppose that
econometric inference takes place in a setting in which the benefit variable b can assume one of
two possible values. For example, one might think of certain regulations as resulting in a binary
flow of profits, for instance, a particular business practice or production input is either allowed
or prohibited. Alternatively, one can think of mapping different genders and political parties to
different values for pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits. Substituting the binary shadow value
formula from equation (14) into equation (20), we obtain the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3: If the benefit variable is binary, with b ∈ {bi, bj}, the causal effect implied by
an observed exogenous shock response is given by
CEbij = SR
b
ij ×
[
1− (1− δ)(Λi + Λj)
r + δ + (1− δ)(Λi + Λj)
]−1
,
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with sgn(CEbij) = sgn(SR
b
ij) and
∣∣∣CEbij
∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣SRbij
∣∣∣ if Λi + Λj > 0.
Proposition 3 shows that if b is a binary random variable, there is always bias and this bias
takes the form of attenuation. That is, in binary settings, shock responses necessarily have the
same sign as the theory-implied causal effect but are smaller in absolute value. This result should
be of comfort to those researchers who care primarily about whether the sign of a shock response
is consistent with the underlying theory-implied comparative statics.
However, if the goal is to estimate economic magnitudes, as is necessary for policy analysis, or to
assess whether particular theories are “first-order,” then Proposition 3 raises important concerns. In
particular, the proposition implies that attenuation bias will be quite severe even in settings with
low shock probabilities. As an example, suppose the econometrician inhabits an economy with
r = 2.5% and δ = 7.25%, our baseline parameter assumptions. This real interest rate assumption
follows Hennessy and Whited (2004) while the assumed depreciation rate reflects an average of zero
for nondecaying stock variables and the 14.5% depreciation rate assumed by Hennessy and Whited
(2004) for real capital stocks. In this case, attenuation bias exceeds one-half the causal effect if the
shock probability (Λ) exceeds 5.26%.
Moving beyond binary settings, suppose b can take on N ≥ 2 possible values and that all
potential transition-to states are equally likely. That is, transitions are uniformly distributed in
the sense that Πij = 1/(N − 1) for all i 6= j. Suppose also that the shock probability is the same
for all N states (Λi = Λ for all i). As shown in the Appendix, the next proposition follows from
applying equation (12) to this stochastic process.
PROPOSITION 4: If the shock probability is a constant Λ for all N possible states and shocks
are uniformly distributed with Πij = 1/(N − 1) for all i 6= j, then the causal effect implied by an
observed shock response is given by
CEbij = SR
b
ij ×
[
1− (1− δ)ΛN/(N − 1)
r + δ + (1− δ)ΛN/(N − 1)
]−1
,
with sgn(CEbij) = sgn(SR
b
ij) and
∣∣∣CEbij
∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣SRbij
∣∣∣ if Λ > 0.
Proposition 4 shows that if there is a common shock probability and transitions are uniformly
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distributed, then there is necessarily bias and this bias features attenuated shock responses relative
to causal effects. Here too, the implied attenuation bias is quite severe. To illustrate, suppose
the econometrician inhabits an economy with r = 2.5% and δ = 7.25%, and suppose there are 10
possible states. In this case, the absolute value of the shock response will be less than one-half that
of the causal effect if the shock probability exceeds 9.47%.
As a second example of Proposition 4, suppose that the shock probability is Λ = (N − 1)/N.
In this particular case, the next-period state is an i.i.d. random variable with each state, including
the present state, occurring with probability 1/N. Here the absolute value of the causal effect will
be an order of magnitude larger than that of the shock response, with CE = SR(1 + r)/(r + δ).
In fact, this is just an example of a more general relationship. To see this, note that if the benefit
flow is an i.i.d. random variable, transient q can be expressed as
qi =
bi + (1− δ)E[b]/(r + δ)
1 + r
. (21)
Computing the implied ratio of shock responses to causal effects (equation (17)) and rearranging
terms yields the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5: If the benefit flow b is an i.i.d. random variable, then the causal effect implied
by an observed shock response is given by
CEbij = SR
b
ij ×
1 + r
r + δ
,
with sgn(CEbij) = sgn(SR
b
ij) and
∣∣∣CEbij
∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣SRbij
∣∣∣ .
Proposition 5 shows that with i.i.d. shocks to the benefit flow, there will be attenuation bias.
Moreover, this bias will be very severe. Intuitively, with i.i.d. shocks, the current period’s flow
of benefits will constitute a relatively small fraction of the total shadow value. For example, if
r = 2.5% and δ = 7.25%, then the causal effect will be more than 10 times the shock response.
Consider next the case of unanticipated temporary changes to the flow of benefits. In partic-
ular, assume state i has the property that the probability of a transition out of that state (Λi)
is infinitesimal, which implies qi ≈ qi∞, but we place no restriction on this state’s conditional
transition-to probabilities, that is, one can assume Πik > 0 for all k 6= i. Suppose also that the
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potential transition-to state j has the property that if a transition from bi to bj occurs, the change
will be “temporary” in the sense that the benefit variable can only revert back to its initial value
bi without transitioning to any other state. We then have the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose that an observed transition from state i to state j was unanticipated
and temporary, with Λi infinitesimal and Πji = 1. Then the causal effect implied by the observed
shock response is
CEbij ≈ SRbij ×
[
1− (1− δ)Λj
r + δ + (1− δ)Λj
]−1
,
with sgn(CEbij) = sgn(SR
b
ij) and
∣∣∣CEbij
∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣SRbij
∣∣∣ .
A few observations are worth noting regarding Proposition 6. First, although the proposition
labels the transition from state i to state j as temporary, since Πji = 1, the proposition holds
regardless of the expected state j occupation time Λ−1j . Second, the bias here is identical in form to
the bias in the case of binary shocks, described in Proposition 3. In particular, the shock response
will have the correct sign but with an attenuated absolute value. Finally, this bias can be severe
even if the probability of shocks is small. For example, if r = 2.5% and δ = 7.25%, then the shock
response will be less than one-half the causal effect if the shock probability Λj is greater than 10.5%.
Having just analyzed the case of unanticipated temporary shocks, we turn to a characterization
of bias in the case of partially anticipated permanent shocks. We have the following result.
PROPOSITION 7: Suppose state i is such that any shock to the benefit flow b will be permanent. If
the realized transition is from bi to bk, then the causal effect implied by the observed shock response
is given by
CEbik = SR
b
ik ×


1−
[
1 + Λ−1i
(
r + δ
1− δ
)]−1
Expected Change︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j 6=i
Πij(bj − bi)
bk − bi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Realized Change


−1
.
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Proposition 7 has a number of important implications. First, note that if the expected change
in the causal variable is zero, then the observed shock response is equal to its corresponding causal
effect. However, if the expected change is not zero, the shock response is necessarily a biased
estimator of the theory-implied causal effect. More importantly, from Proposition 7 it follows
that with permanent shocks, there can be attenuation bias, overshooting, and sign reversals. The
following corollary delineates the bias regions.
COROLLARY 1: Suppose state i is such that any shock to the benefit flow b will be permanent,
with the conditional expectation of the change not equal to zero. Then the sign and magnitude of the
wedge between causal effects and the shock response depend on the realized value bk. If the expected
change was positive, then
bk − bi < 0⇒ SRik < CEik < 0
bk − bi ∈

0,
∑
j 6=i
Πij(bj − bi)
1 + Λ−1i
(
r+δ
1−δ
)

⇒ SRik < 0 < CEik
bk − bi ≥
∑
j 6=i
Πij(bj − bi)
1 + Λ−1i
(
r+δ
1−δ
) ⇒ 0 ≤ SRik < CEik.
If the expected change was negative, then
bk − bi > 0⇒ SRik > CEik > 0
bk − bi ∈


∑
j 6=i
Πij(bj − bi)
1 + Λ−1i
(
r+δ
1−δ
) , 0

⇒ SRik > 0 > CEik
bk − bi ≤
∑
j 6=i
Πij(bj − bi)
1 + Λ−1i
(
r+δ
1−δ
) ⇒ 0 ≥ SRik > CEik.
The intuition for Corollary 1 is as follows. Consider, say, a setting in which the conditional
expectation of the change in b was positive. If the realized change is negative, the shock response
will have the correct (negative) sign but will overshoot the causal effect in absolute value terms.
Heuristically, an objectively bad shock becomes a terrible shock if the expected shock was positive.
If instead the realized shock involved a large increase in b, the shock response will have the correct
positive sign but be biased downwards. Heuristically, objectively great news becomes good news
22
A
cc
ep
te
d
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
if positive news was expected. Finally, if the realized shock entails a sufficiently small (relative to
expectations) increase in b, the shock response will actually have the wrong sign. Heuristically, an
objectively good shock becomes a bad shock if a better shock had been expected.
Corollary 1 allows one to readily compute the ex ante probability of the various biases, atten-
uation, overshooting, and sign reversals, depending on the probability of a shock, the probability
distribution of shocks, the discount rate, and the rate of stock decay. One simply needs to compute
the probability of the shock falling into the respective bias regions described in the corollary.
To illustrate, suppose that r = 2.5% and δ = 7.25%. Suppose further that a shock is viewed
as relatively unlikely, with Λi = 20%, and that any change in b is uniformly distributed on [-0.15,
0.85]. It follows from Corollary 1 that the shock response will overshoot the causal effect if the
realized change is negative, a change that occurs with probability 15%. For positive shocks in the
interval [0,0.23], the shock response will actually be negative. That is, there is a 23% probability
of the shock response having the wrong sign. Finally, for the remaining 62% of potential shock
realizations, the shock response will undershoot the causal effect.
Continuing with the preceding example, Figure 1 plots the ratio of shock response to causal
effect under alternative depreciation rates of 0%, 7.25%, and 14.5%. In all cases, the shock response
differs from the causal effect, with overshooting for negative shocks, undershooting for sufficiently
large positive shocks, and incorrect signs for small positive shocks. Consistent with the corollary,
the measure of the sign reversal region decreases with the depreciation rate, implying that the
problem of sign reversals is less severe for shorter-lived assets.
III. Identifying Assumptions
In the preceding section we show that empirically observed responses to exogenous shocks to the
intertemporal benefit flow variable b will generally not recover the theory-implied causal effect. In
fact, we show that shock responses do not even necessarily have the same sign as the causal effect.
However, we provide a general correction algorithm (Proposition 2), as well as specific correction
formulae for binary settings (Proposition 3), transient uniformly distributed shocks (Proposition
4), i.i.d. shocks (Proposition 5), unanticipated temporary shocks (Proposition 6), and anticipated
permanent shocks (Proposition 7). The objective of this section is to provide empiricists with a set
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of identifying assumptions that would need to be demonstrated beyond exogeneity, ensuring that
shock responses are equal in magnitude or sign to theory-implied causal effects.
One expects shock responses to approximate causal effects if the shock process features al-
most completely unanticipated changes that are nearly permanent. Indeed, we have the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 8: In the limit as all shock probabilities tend to zero, each measured shock response
converges to its respective causal effect.
The preceding result provides a formal justification for the invocation of “unexpected and
permanent shocks” as an identifying assumption for the recovery of theory-implied causal effects.
However, it suffers from two practical limitations. First, natural experiments exploiting rare events
must truly be short in supply. A second problem associated with claiming to exploit a permanent
shock is that one tends to be interested in analyzing a given historical shock response with the
goal of making forecasts of future shock responses or setting policy optimally in the future, which
contradicts the notion that the observed shock is permanent. Conveniently, we have the following
alternative identifying assumption.
PROPOSITION 9: The necessary and sufficient condition for shock responses to equal causal
effects for each possible jump in the intertemporal benefit flow is that b is a martingale: the best
state (1) and worst state (N) must be absorbing, with remaining states being absorbing or featuring
mean-zero changes.
To provide intuition for Proposition 9 it is convenient to express the value of a unit of stock as
the discounted value of the expected flow of benefits it provides. Under the martingale assumption,
this value can be written as
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qi =
∞∑
t=1
(
1
1 + r
)t
(1− δ)t−1{E0[b(t)|b(0) = bi]} (22)
=
∞∑
t=1
(
1
1 + r
)t
(1− δ)t−1bi
=
bi
r + δ
.
The second line in the preceding equation holds under the assumption that the benefit flow is a
martingale. Effectively, with the martingale assumption, the shadow value of the stock capitalizes
the current state as if it will last forever. And this holds before each and after each shock. Thus, at
each point in time the firm acts as if the current state will last forever despite knowing it will not.
In such environments, the econometrician can directly recover causal effects from shock responses–
and this is true even if shocks occur frequently. Thus, under the martingale assumption, transient
q is equivalent to permanent q∞ period-by-period, so that accumulation would be identical across
the stochastic and nonstochastic economies.
In some cases, an empiricist may be interested in the more limited objective of avoiding the
possibility of a shock response having a different sign than the theory-implied causal effect. A
description of identifying assumptions that ensure against sign reversals is therefore worthwhile.
Recall that we derive a number of such sign-identification conditions above. We now offer an
alternative sufficient condition for avoiding sign reversals.
Since bj > bi for all j < i, and accumulation is increasing in q, a sufficient condition for the
absence of sign reversals is qj ≥ qi for all j < i. This will necessarily be true under stochastic
monotonicity : for all j 6= i and b̂ ∈ {b1, ..., bN},
bj > bi ⇒ Pr
[
bt+1 ≤ b̂|bt = bj
]
≤ Pr
[
bt+1 ≤ b̂|bt = bi
]
.
That is, under stochastic monotonicity, if bj > bi, then the distribution of future states conditional
on current state bj is first order stochastic dominant to the distribution conditional on current
state bi. In practice, applied researchers might advance a verbal plausibility argument in defense of
a stochastic monotonicity assumption. More formally, Lee, Linton, and Whang (2009) offer a test
statistic for assessing the null hypothesis of stochastic monotonicity given an observed time series.
Alternatively, given an estimated Markov transition matrix, Keilson and Kester (1977) present
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necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic monotonicity. Finally, as shown by Keilson and
Kester (1977), a number of common processes are stochastically monotone, such as random walks
with absorbing or impenetrable boundaries.
The following proposition summarizes the conditions that we derive for the avoidance of sign
reversals, but is insufficient for correct identification of causal effect magnitudes.
PROPOSITION 10: For changes in the intertemporal benefit flow b, the shock response has the
same sign as the causal effect if the benefit flow is binary (Proposition 3), shocks are transient and
uniformly distributed (Proposition 4), shocks are i.i.d. (Proposition 5), the shock is unanticipated
and temporary (Proposition 5), or the benefit process is stochastically monotone. If shocks are per-
manent with nonzero expected changes, sufficient conditions for the avoidance of sign reversals are
that the realized change differs in sign from the expected change or that the realized change is equal
in sign but not less than the expected change (Proposition 7).
IV. External Validity and Extrapolation
Up to this point we limit attention to determining the relationship between measured shock
responses and causal effects. In this section we consider the related question of how observed shock
responses can be extrapolated. In particular, we first consider how an observed shock response in
a specific economy can be used to forecast future shock responses in the same economy. We then
consider how an observed shock response in a given economy can be used to forecast future shock
responses in an otherwise identical economy endowed with a different shock-generating process.
A. Challenges to External Validity
An observation following directly from the model is that it is not generally valid to use the shock
response in one economy to forecast the shock response in another economy. This argument holds
even if the change in the policy variable is the same and the economies have identical production
technologies. To see this, note that it follows from equation (12) that if economies A and B have
different shock processes, then their augmented transition matrices will differ (TA 6= TB), implying
differences in q and different responses to shocks to the benefit flow b. In other words, as argued
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by Lucas (1976), if the data-generating process changes (represented here by T), the decision rules
(the SRbij) will change. This is a strong limitation on external validity.
In fact, the Lucas Critique is just one limit on extrapolation. The model illustrates another
important limit to external validity. Specifically, even if one considers a single economy and holds
fixed the augmented transition matrix T, so that the Lucas Critique does not apply, it is generally
not valid to directly use a previous shock response to forecast future shock responses.
To illustrate these two limits to external validity, we provide two numerical examples featuring
shocks to the benefit variable b. Specifically, it is assumed that the tax rate, call it τ , can take on 10
possible values ranging from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 45% with the assumed benefit flow
taking the form b = 1− τ. Thus, the tax rate jump across neighboring states is 5 percentage points.
Both examples assume that the tax rate can jump only to one of its direct neighbors. Arguably,
small yet discrete jumps of the sort considered here are more realistic than infinitesimal jumps in
the tax rate. Finally, both examples use the previous parameter value assumptions, with r = 2.5%
and δ = 7.25%.
The first example considers an economy in which corporate tax rates have a tendency to drift
downward. Specifically, it is assumed that the probability of a decrease in the tax rate is 15% and
the probability of an increase is 5%. The shock responses are presented in Table I. As shown, the
fact that there is a higher probability of a tax rate reduction results in asymmetric shock responses.
In particular, since a tax decrease is more likely, the shadow value of the stock variable (qi) is
pushed upward, implying relatively large (small) responses to tax rate increases (decreases). For
example, starting at τ = 5%, the shock response for a 5 percentage point tax rate decrease is 0.236
while that for a 5 percentage point tax rate increase is -0.364, a 54% difference. In addition, the
magnitude of shock responses varies greatly across the different states. For example, the minimum
shock response is 0.236 and the maximum shock response is 0.503, a difference of 113%.
The previous example highlights the potential pitfall associated with extrapolating shock re-
sponses within a given economy. Consider now the challenge of extrapolating shock responses
across economies. To this end, suppose Table I captures shock responses in Economy 1, with Table
II capturing shock responses in an otherwise identical economy, but one where the tax rate has a
mean-reverting tendency. Specifically, Table II assumes that for tax rates in the low range, from
0% to 20%, the probability of a tax rate increase is 15% and the probability of a decrease is 5%.
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Conversely, for tax rates in the high range, from 25% to 45%, the probability of a tax rate increase
is 5% and the probability of a tax rate decrease is 15%. The first obvious point to note is that there
are large state-by-state differences in shock responses across the two economies. Moreover, there
is a systematic difference in the behavior of relative shock responses. In Economy 1 the smallest
shock responses are found at the low tax rates, while in Economy 2 the smallest shock response is
found for mid-range tax rates.
Despite the fact that the two economies are identical in terms of the technologies and objective
functions of their respective firms, the shock responses in Economy 1 provide little in the way of
directly useful information for forecasting shock responses in Economy 2. What is needed for valid
extrapolation is a procedure for making adjustments to shock responses to account for differences
in data-generating processes. We analyze the problem of extrapolation next.
B. Extrapolation and Parameter Inference
This subsection considers the problem of extrapolating shock responses both within and across
economies. Consider first the simplest case in which one observes the response of firms in Economy
1 to a transition in the price of the stock from pi to pj . The researcher wants to use the observed
shock response to forecast the behavior of firms in the same economy, or to forecast the behavior of
firms in another economy facing a different shock-generating process. In either case, one can think
of the objective as using the shock response SRpij to forecast shock responses to a transition in the
price of the stock from, say, ph to pk. From equation (16) we have
SRphk = (−ξ)(pk − ph) =
(
SRpij
pj − pi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−ξ
(pk − ph) = SRpij ×
[
pk − ph
pj − pi
]
. (23)
Notice that the final inequality in equation (23) tells us that regardless of the underlying stochas-
tic processes, the correct procedure for extrapolating the measured price shock response is to simply
scale by the relative size of the shocks. The second inequality in equation (23) tells us that extrap-
olation of shock responses implicitly entails inferring the structural parameter ξ measuring ease of
stock adjustment. In fact, it is the implicit/explicit inference of a policy-invariant parameter that
allows for extrapolation.
Consider next the problem of extrapolating an observed shock to the cost of stock adjustment
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ξ either within a given economy or to another economy with a different shock-generating process.
The objective is to use an observed shock response SRξij to forecast shock responses to a transition
from ξh to ξk. From equation (16) we have
SRξhk = (q − p)(ξk − ξh) =
(
SRξij
ξj − ξi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−p
(ξk − ξh) = SRξij ×
[
ξk − ξh
ξj − ξi
]
. (24)
Again, the final inequality in equation (24) tells us that regardless of the underlying stochastic
processes, the correct procedure for extrapolating the measured adjustment cost shock response is
to simply scale by the relative size of the shocks. And again, the second inequality informs us that
extrapolation can be understood as based on implicit/explicit structural parameter inference, here
the gross gain to accumulation, q − p.
Consider finally the problem of extrapolating an observed shock to the intertemporal benefit
flow b either within a given economy or to another economy with a different shock-generating
process. The objective is to use an observed shock response SRbij to forecast shock responses to a
transition from bh to bk. From equation (16) we have
SRbhk = ξ(qk − qh) =
(
SRbij
qj − qi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξ
(qk − qh) = SRbij ×
[
qk − qh
qj − qi
]
. (25)
Note that there is a superficial resemblance between the extrapolation formula given in equation
(25) and those given in equations (23) and (24). However, the latter two formulae entail scaling the
observed shock response by the relative size of the shocks to the underlying causal variable, with
no need to consider the underlying stochastic processes. In contrast, equation (25) indicates that
extrapolating shocks to the intertemporal benefit flow b demands scaling by relative changes in the
shadow value of the stock variable. This requires a careful accounting for underlying stochastic
processes via equations (12) and (13).
Intuitively, the extrapolation formula in equation (25) can be understood as a two-step process.
In the first step, one computes the shock response per unit of shadow value (ξ) by normalizing the
historical shock response by the change in shadow value at the shock date. This is then re-scaled
by the change in shadow value associated with the contemplated future-date transition.
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V. Numerical Example: Taxes and Corporate Investment
This section provides a numerical example illustrating how one can go about inferring causal
effects and causal parameters based on observed shock responses assuming the observed stochastic
process for the causal variable b fails to satisfy one of the previously derived conditions for equality
of shock responses and causal effects. The primary objective here is to illustrate how one can apply
Proposition 2 in a real-world setting where the data-generating process must be inferred based
on an observed time series. In addition, the numerical example illustrates the potentially large
quantitative impact of dynamic tax policy uncertainty.
Consider an econometrician interested in estimating the sign and magnitude of the causal effect
of taxes on corporate investment. For the sake of the numerical illustration, we assume that the
periodic benefit flow per unit of capital is bt ≡ 1− τt, where τt is the observed history of effective
tax rates on corporate investment over the period from 1953 to 2005, as computed by Gravelle
(1994) and the Congressional Research Service (2006).8
To focus on the challenges arising from dynamic uncertainty, we abstract from concerns about
endogeneity here and assume that the observed tax rate series was generated by the exogenous
process
τt =
1
1 + exp(−εt)
, (26)
where εt is an AR(1) process with unconditional mean µ and autocorrelation ρ:
εt = µ(1− ρ) + ρεt−1 + ut. (27)
The shock ut is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2. Note that the
posited logistic functional form for the effective tax rate, which has also been used to model factor
shares, has the property that the tax rate has support on the proper interval (0, 1).
We map the observed sequence of effective tax rates back to an implied sequence for the AR(1)
process by inverting equation (26):
εt = − ln(τ−1t − 1).
8This is a simplification because we do not separate the total effective tax rate into its consitutent parts.
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We then estimate the parameters of the underlying AR(1) process using Maximum Likelihood. We
find that the estimate for the unconditional mean µ is 0.0158, that for the autocorrelation ρ is
0.917, and that for the innovation variance σ2 is 0.0261.
We next obtain a discrete state-space approximation for the estimated AR(1) process using the
method proposed by Adda and Cooper (2003), which is a variation of Tauchen (1986) and Tauchen
and Hussey (1991). Discretizing the state space into three points, we obtain a tax rate of 35.5% in
the best state (state 1), 50.4% in state 2, and 62.7% in state 3. If we instead discretize the state
space into four points, we obtain state-contingent tax rates of 33.3%, 45.9%, 54.9%, and 67.4%.
Table III provides details on the estimated transition rates for three and four states. In the
case of the three-state approximation, the probability of a shock falls between 15% and 25%. In
the case of the four-state approximation, the probability of a shock falls between 17% and 33%.
We next use equations (12) and (13) to estimate the shadow value of capital (q) in each tax
rate state. We then compute the implied ratio of shock responses to causal effects using equation
(17) under the assumed parameter values r = 2.5% and δ = 7.25%.
Table IV presents the implied ratios of shock responses to theory-implied causal effects for each
possible tax rate transition. From equation (17) it follows that two matrices are symmetric. In the
case of the three-state approximation, the implied ratio of shock responses to causal effects falls in
a narrow range from 0.425 to 0.427. In the case of the four-state approximation, the implied ratio
of shock responses to causal effects ranges from 0.440 to 0.548. In general, implied shock responses
amount to less than one-half the theory implied causal effect.
Clearly, a halving of the true causal effect can lead to erroneous conclusions. For example,
one might be led to conclude that taxes have only a second-order effect on real investment. More
importantly, this type of bias could lead to an erroneous halving of the estimated welfare loss from
taxation. For example, Rosen (1992) calculates the excess burden from taxation as the difference
between taxes collected and the loss to the firm. Applying his method, the per-period excess burden
from corporate taxes on the return to capital would be calculated as9
9See Rosen (1992), page 327.
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EB =
1
2
×∆q ×∆a (28)
=
1
2
× τqpretax × [ξ(qpretax − p)− ξ((1− τ)qpretax − p)]
=
1
2
τ2q2pretaxξ.
Note that the excess burden is linear in ξ, which is the structural parameter capturing the “elastic-
ity” of investment to changes in the shadow value of capital. If an econometrician were to attempt
a calculation of the excess burden while failing to account for transience in the structural parameter
estimate, they would understate the excess burden from taxation by roughly 50%. To see this, note
that equation (20) implies that the estimated excess burden here would be
ÊB =
1
2
τ2q2pretaxξ̂ =
1
2
τ2q2pretax
(
SRbij
CEbij
)
ξ = EB ×
(
SRbij
CEbij
)
. (29)
VI. Alternative Technology Assumptions
Thus far we focus on the classical linear-quadratic technology whereby the firm receives a benefit
inflow that is linear in the stock and faces adjustment costs that are quadratic in accumulation.
This technology merits focus since, as shown above (equation (7)), it maps directly to the linear
causal effects econometric model. Specifically, with such a linear-quadratic technology, theory-
implied causal effects are proportional to changes in the underlying causal parameters, namely,
benefit inflow (b), price of the stock (p), and ease of stock adjustment (ξ). This section analyzes
the relationship between shock responses and theory-implied causal effects for firms endowed with
different benefit inflow and adjustment cost functions.
As argued by Summers (1981), to empirically replicate observed investment dynamics, it appears
necessary to impose large stock adjustment costs, as otherwise predicted investment appears to
be excessively sensitive to the shadow value of capital. Nevertheless, for light capital goods, large
adjustment costs may be considered unreasonable. With this in mind, we first consider the extreme
case of a firm enjoying the ability to adjust the stock variable s without incurring any adjustment
costs. Suppose also that the benefit inflow is concave, taking the form bF (s), where b is a stochastic
process and F is a strictly increasing concave function that satisfies the Inada conditions.10 As
10If profits were linear here, the firm would either buy or sell an infinite amount of the stock.
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shown in the Appendix, the optimal policy at each point in time t is to increase the stock until its
discounted marginal product, inclusive of expected resale value, is just equal to its current market
price:11
pt =
(
1
1 + r
)[
btF
′(s∗t ) + (1− δ)Et[pt+1]
]
(30)
⇒ s∗t = [F ′]−1
[
(1 + r)pt − (1− δ)Et[pt+1]
bt
]
.
By way of comparison, in the context of a deterministic dynamic model in which b and p are
treated as parameters rather than processes, the optimal stock level can be expressed in terms of
the Jorgenson (1963) user cost of capital, (r + δ)p. In particular
s∗∗ = [F ′]−1
[
(1 + r)p− (1− δ)p
b
]
= [F ′]−1
[
(r + δ)p
b
]
. (31)
From equation (30) it follows that here the firm’s response to price shocks will depend on the
law of motion for the price. Intuitively, with frictionless stock adjustment, expected price dynamics
matter since the firm acts as if it will sell its asset stock at the end of each period and then re-
optimize. Comparing equation (30) with equation (31) it is also apparent that with frictionless
stock adjustment, responses to price shocks do not generally equal theory-predicted causal effects.
However, if the stock price is a martingale, or if price shocks are completely unanticipated and
permanent, then s∗ = s∗∗ and price shock responses directly recover causal effects.
Equation (30) also reveals that with frictionless stock adjustment, the firm’s response to benefit
shocks are actually invariant to the law of motion for the benefit inflow scalar b. Here benefit shock
responses equal theory-predicted causal effects. Intuitively, with frictionless stock adjustment, the
firm re-optimizes the level of the stock each period based on the currently observed inflow of benefits.
Summarizing, we have the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 11 (Concave Benefit Inflow and No Stock Adjustment Costs): With exogenous
changes in the spot price of the stock, shock responses recover theory-implied causal effects only if
the price is a martingale or the shock is completely unanticipated and permanent. With exogenous
changes in the benefit inflow scalar, measured shock responses directly recover theory-implied causal
11The derivations in this section do not impose Markov shocks.
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effects regardless of the underlying stochastic process.
Recall that in our baseline technology with linear benefits and quadratic adjustment costs,
price shock responses directly recover causal effects, while benefit shock responses do so only if
benefits are a martingale or if benefit shocks are completely unanticipated and permanent. In
contrast, Proposition 11 shows that with concave benefits and zero adjustment costs, benefit shock
responses directly recover causal effects, while price shock responses do so only if the stock price is
a martingale or if price shocks are completely unanticipated and permanent.
Consider next a firm facing quadratic adjustment costs (a2/2ξ), as in the baseline model, but
suppose as immediately above that the benefit inflow is concave in the stock, taking the form bF (s).
Comparative statics do not suffice to evaluate causal effects in this setting since, even with zero
uncertainty, the optimal accumulation policy (a) would vary over time depending on the level of
the capital stock relative to the steady state. In particular, as in the model of Summers (1981), a
completely unanticipated and permanent change in parameters would be modeled as a jump onto
a new saddle-point path converging to a new steady state. For example, starting at an initial
steady state, an increase in b (decrease in p) would be associated with an increase in accumulation
converging to a higher steady-state stock. Nevertheless, it is apparent that a correct interpretation
of real-world shocks to either the stock price or the benefit flow would here require correct modeling
of the stochastic process generating shocks. In particular, as shown in the Appendix, with shocks
to the stock price and/or the benefit flow, the optimal accumulation policy under the posited
technology takes the form
a∗t = ξ
[(
1
1 + r
)( ∞∑
τ=0
(
1− δ
1 + r
)τ
Et[bt+τF ′(st+τ )]
)
− pt
]
. (32)
The key implication of equation (32) is that if the benefit inflow function is concave, responses to
both price and benefit shocks will depend on the data-generating process for the shocks. To see
this, note that optimal accumulation at date t depends upon expectations of the future path of the
stock, which depend in turn on expectations regarding the future path of prices and benefits.
Finally, let us again consider a firm with a concave benefit function but assume now that adjust-
ment costs depend on the level of the stock. In particular, following Summers (1981), assume that
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adjustment costs take the form γa2t /2st−1. As shown in the Appendix, under such an adjustment
cost function, the optimal rate of accumulation takes the form
a∗t
st−1
=
1
γ
[( ∞∑
τ=0
(
1− δ
1 + r
)τ
Et
{
bt+τF
′(st+τ ) +
1
1 + r
γ
2
(
at+τ+1
st+τ
)2})
− pt
]
. (33)
The key implication of equation (33) is that with stock-dependent adjustment costs, responses
to both benefit shocks and price shocks depend on the data-generating process for the shocks.
Moreover, this is true even if the benefit function is linear. To see this, note that the optimal
accumulation rate at date t depends on expectations of the future accumulation rate squared,
which depends in turn on expected future prices. Intuitively, under the posited adjustment cost
function, installed capital provides a direct inflow of benefits as well as an indirect benefit in terms
of reducing future adjustment costs. The present value of the reduction in future adjustment costs
thus depends on expected future prices.
VII. Conclusions
The first objective of this paper is to highlight the existence of a large and important gap
between underlying theories and the types of empirical evidence often used to assess the validity
or importance of those theories.
On the one hand, modelers typically derive testable implications of underlying theories using
comparative statics analysis. Heuristically, comparative statics yields predictions regarding how
agents will respond to completely unanticipated completely permanent shocks. On the other hand,
empiricists routinely exploit data generating processes that differ markedly from the type of rare-
event shocks that comparative statics analysis approximates, for example, state-level anti-takeover
legislation or tax changes. Indeed, if empiricists were to confine attention to truly rare events,
they would need to wait a rather long time for nature to provide experiments that shed light on
important economic questions. Moreover, the fact that empirical evidence is often used to inform
policy decisions or to make predictions about responses to future shocks contradicts the assumption
that exploited shocks are permanent.
Deaton (2010) expresses reservations about instrumental variables estimation, specifically about
the lack of an ex ante characterization of what such estimation is credibly recovering, with estimates
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varying with the choice among valid instruments: “This goes beyond the old story of looking for
an object where the light is strong enough to see; rather, we have at least some control over
the light but choose to let it fall where it may and then proclaim that whatever it illuminates is
what we were looking for all along.” We show that a similar problem of interpretation emerges
with shock-based inference in dynamic environments. In general, shock responses do not directly
recover theory-implied causal effects (comparative statics). Moreover shock-based estimates are not
generally comparable to each other, as estimates vary within and across alternative data-generating
processes.
What is to be done? Wolpin (2013) and Rust (2014) argue for a general need to filter empirical
evidence through the prism of models, a point to which many pay lip service. The question is how
to make this prescription operational in a tractable way. The approach that we take here straddles
reduced-form and structural approaches. On the one hand, we focus on the best type of reduced-
form evidence–evidence that exploits exogenous shocks and thus avoids selection and endogeneity
bias. On the other hand, we build a general stylized model mimicking the data-generating process
exploited by the econometrician to flush out the economic meaning of broad classes of reduced-form
evidence derived in dynamic settings.
The second and primary point of our paper is constructive, showing how empiricists can address
head-on generally neglected issues associated with dynamic uncertainty, economic interpretability,
and external validity. In particular, we show how once the data-generating process has been es-
timated, observed shock responses can be mapped back to theory-implied causal effects, or gen-
eralized within or across shock-generating processes. In addition, we derive a battery of auxiliary
identifying assumptions, beyond exogeneity, that must be established to demonstrate lack of bias
in magnitudes/signs. Finally, we offer tractable bias adjustment formulae for various classes of
data-generating processes.
Our analysis also highlights the critical role played by alternative technological assumptions.
For example, with linear benefits and quadratic adjustment costs, the stochastic process matters
for interpreting benefit shocks but not for shocks to the price of the stock variable. With concave
benefits and zero adjustment costs, these conclusions are reversed. Thus, it is apparent that in-
terpreting shock responses requires making joint assumptions about orthogonality, data-generating
processes, and underlying real technologies. The first of these assumptions is often discussed, but
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the latter two are generally neglected. Our paper makes a first attempt at addressing the latter
two problems, with heavy emphasis on the linear-quadratic economy. Future work should attempt
to provide reduced-form empiricists with analogous tractable methods and formulae for bias ad-
justment under alternative technological assumptions.
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Appendix: Proofs and Derivations
A. Constant Policy Model Solution
Letting β = 1/(1 + r), the Bellman equation can be written as
V (s) = max
a
βbs′ − pa− 1
2
ξ−1a2 + βV (s′),
subject to
s′ = (1− δ) + a.
We conjecture that the value function is of the form
V (s) = q̂s+G.
Note that q̂ represents the value of a unit of capital already in installed at the beginning of the
period–which will depreciate during the period. Under the conjectured functional form, the Bellman
equation can thus be written as
q̂s+G = max
a
βbs′ − pa− 1
2
ξ−1a2 + β{q̂s′ +G},
subject to the law of motion for capital. Substituting in the law of motion for capital we obtain
q̂s+G = max
a
−pa− 1
2
ξ−1a2 + β{(q̂ + b)[(1− δ)s+ a] +G}
Terms scaled by s must equate, so we have
q̂ =
(
1− δ
1 + r
)
(q̂ + b)⇒ q̂ = b(1− δ)
r + δ
.
Optimal capital accumulation solves
max
a
(
1
1 + r
)
(b+ q̂)a− pa− 1
2
ξ−1a2.
To capture the value of capital installed during the period, we write
q ≡ q̂
1− δ ⇒
(
1
1 + r
)
(b+ q̂) = q.
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The investment program can then be written as
max
a
qa− pa− 1
2
ξ−1a2 ⇒ a∗∗ = ξ(q − p).
Finally, consider growth option value. At the optimal policy
qa− pa− 1
2
ξ−1a2 =
1
2
ξ(q − p)2.
Substituting the preceding equation into the Bellman equation and ignoring the terms scaled by s
(which cancel), we obtain
G =
1
2
ξ(q − p)2 +
(
1
1 + r
)
G⇒ G =
(
1 +
1
r
)
1
2
ξ(q − p)2.
B. Shock Model Solution
The Bellman equation is
Vi(s) = max
a
−pia−
1
2
ξ−1i a
2 +
(
1
1 + r
)
bis′ + (1− Λi)Vi(s′) + Λi
∑
j 6=i
ΠijVj(s
′)

 ,
subject to
s′ = (1− δ) + a.
We conjecture that the value function is of the form
Vi(s) = q̂is+Gi.
Note that q̂i captures the value of a unit of capital already installed at the beginning of the period–
which will depreciate during the period. The Bellman equation can thus be written as
q̂is+Gi = −pia−
1
2
ξ−1i a
2 +
(
1
1 + r
)
(1− Λi)Gi + Λi
∑
j 6=i
ΠijGj


+
(
1
1 + r
)
bi + (1− Λi)q̂i + Λi
∑
j 6=i
Πij q̂j

 [a+ (1− δ)s].
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Terms scaled by s in the preceding equation must equate, so we have
q̂i =
(
1− δ
1 + r
)
bi + (1− Λi)q̂i + Λi
∑
j 6=i
Πij q̂j

 .
We therefore have a linear system for the value of the beginning-of-period stock:
q̂i[r + δ + (1− δ)Λi]− (1− δ)Λi
∑
j 6=i
Πij q̂j = (1− δ)bi.
Using the augmented transition matrix (equation (13)), the preceding linear system can be written
as


q̂1
...
q̂N

 =
[
T−1
]


(1− δ)b1
...
(1− δ)bN

 .
Next, consider optimal accumulation. From the Bellman equation it follows that we must solve
max
a
(
1
1 + r
)
bi + (1− Λi)q̂i + Λi
∑
j 6=i
Πij q̂j

 a− pia−
1
2
ξ−1i a
2.
To capture the value of newly installed units of the stock, we let
qi ≡
q̂i
1− δ .
Our program can then be written as
max
a
qia− pia−
1
2
ξ−1i a
2 ⇒ a∗i = ξi(qi − pi).
As stated in the text, we have the following solution for the value of a unit of new accumulation:


q1
...
qN

 =
[
T−1
]


b1
...
bN

 .
Now, consider the growth option value. Under optimal accumulation
qia− pia−
1
2
ξ−1i a
2 =
1
2
ξi(qi − pi)2.
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Substituting the preceding equation into the Bellman system and ignoring the terms scaled by s
(which cancel), we obtain
Gi =
(
1
1 + r
)
(1− Λi)Gi + Λi
∑
j 6=i
ΠijGj

+ 1
2
ξi(qi − pi)2.
Rearranging terms, we obtain the following linear system:


G1
...
GN

 =
[
T−1G
]


1
2(1 + r)ξ1(q1 − p1)2
...
1
2(1 + r)ξN (qN − pN )2

 ,
where
TG ≡


r + Λ1 −Λ1Π12 ... −Λ1Π1N
−Λ2Π21 r + Λ2 ... −Λ2Π2N
... ... ... ...
−ΛNΠN1 −ΛNΠN2 ... r + ΛN


.
C. Proof of Proposition 4
For brevity, let R ≡ r + δ. We have the following N ×N augmented transition matrix:
T ≡


R+ (1− δ)Λ −(1− δ)Λ/(N − 1) ... −(1− δ)Λ/(N − 1)
−(1− δ)Λ/(N − 1) R+ (1− δ)Λ ... −(1− δ)Λ/(N − 1)
... ... ... ...
−(1− δ)Λ/(N − 1) −(1− δ)Λ/(N − 1) ... R+ (1− δ)Λ


.
The shadow values are 

q1
q2
...
qN


= T−1


b1
b2
...
bN


,
where
T−1 =
1
R[R+ (1− δ)ΛN/(N − 1)]


R+ (1− δ)Λ/(N − 1) (1− δ)Λ/(N − 1) ... (1− δ)Λ/(N − 1)
(1− δ)Λ/(N − 1) R+ (1− δ)Λ/(N − 1) ... (1− δ)Λ/(N − 1)
... ... ... ...
(1− δ)Λ/(N − 1) (1− δ)Λ/(N − 1) ... R+ (1− δ)Λ/(N − 1)


.
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Taking differences across rows, the transition response of the shadow value is
qj − qi =
[
1− (1− δ)ΛN/(N − 1)
r + δ + (1− δ)ΛN/(N − 1)
](
bj − bi
r + δ
)
.
Thus, the change in transient q is the stated multiple of the change in permanent q. The result
then follows from the fact that ∆a = ξ∆q.
D. Proof of Proposition 6
Under the assumptions stated in the proposition, the transition-to state shadow value takes the
form
qj =
(
1
1 + r
)
[bj + (1− δ)(1− Λj)qj + (1− δ)Λjqi]
⇒ qj =
bj + (1− δ)Λjqi
r + δ + (1− δ)Λj
.
Using the fact that qi ≈ qi∞, we have
qj ≈
bj
r + δ + (1− δ)Λj
+
[
(1− δ)Λj
r + δ + (1− δ)Λj
]
qi∞
=
bj
r + δ
−
[
(1− δ)Λj
r + δ + (1− δ)Λj
]
(qj∞ − qi∞)
= qj∞ −
[
(1− δ)Λj
r + δ + (1− δ)Λj
]
(qj∞ − qi∞).
It then follows that
CEbij
SRbij
=
ξ (∆q∞)
ξ (∆q)
=
(bj − bi)/(r + δ)
qj − qi
⇒ CEbij = SRbij ×
(bj − bi)/(r + δ)
qj − qi
= SRbij ×
[
1−
(
(1− δ)Λj
r + δ + (1− δ)Λj
)]−1
.
E. Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose the state is i and all possible transition-to states are absorbing. From equation (7) it
follows that
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SRbik = CE
b
ik + ξ
[
bi
r + δ
− qi
]
.
Further, since all possible transition-to states are absorbing, equation (11) can be written as
qi =
(
1
1 + r
)
bi + (1− δ)

(1− Λi)qi + Λi
∑
j 6=i
Πij
bj
r + δ




⇒ qi =
bi
r + δ + Λi(1− δ)
+
(1− δ)Λi
(r + δ)[r + δ + Λi(1− δ)]
∑
j 6=i
Πijbj
⇒ qi =
bi
r + δ
+
(1− δ)Λi
(r + δ)[r + δ + (1− δ)Λi]
∑
j 6=i
Πij(bj − bi)
⇒ qi =
bi
r + δ
+ (r + δ)−1
[
1 + Λ−1i
(
r + δ
1− δ
)]−1∑
j 6=i
Πij(bj − bi).
From the preceding expression for qi it follows that
SRbik = CE
b
ik − ξ(r + δ)−1
[
1 + Λ−1i
(
r + δ
1− δ
)]−1∑
j 6=i
Πij(bj − bi)
= CEbik − ξ
[
bk − bi
r + δ
] [
1 + Λ−1i
(
r + δ
1− δ
)]−1 ∑
j 6=i Πij(bj − bi)
bk − bi
= CEbik
[
1−
[
1 + Λ−1i
(
r + δ
1− δ
)]−1 ∑
j 6=i Πij(bj − bi)
bk − bi
]
.
F. Proof of Proposition 8
Since T is Strictly Diagonal Dominant, it is invertible. Moreover, each entry in the inverse
is the quotient of a polynomial and the determinant. Thus, fixing, say, the Euclidean norm, the
inverse function is continuous on the set of invertible matrices. It follows that
lim
Λ↓0
[T(Λ)]−1 = [T(0)]−1 = (r + δ)−1IN .
This implies that each qi converges to bi/(r+δ) and hence that each SR
b
ij converges to each CE
b
ij .
G. Proof of Proposition 9
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Consider an array of distinct states 1 to N recalling that the indexing convention entails b1 >
... > bN . A necessary and sufficient condition for each treatment response to equal its respective
causal effect is that the difference between state-contingent shadow values is equal to their respective
difference in shadow values under permanent b values. That is, there must then exist some constant
κ such that for all i,
qi =
bi
r + δ
+ κ.
Under this functional form, the equilibrium conditions (11) can be stated as
(r + δ)κ =
(
1− δ
r + δ
)
Λ1
∑
j 6=1
Π1j(bj − b1)
(r + δ)κ =
(
1− δ
r + δ
)
Λ2
∑
j 6=2
Π2j(bj − b2)
...
(r + δ)κ =
(
1− δ
r + δ
)
ΛN−1
∑
j 6=N−1
ΠN−1j(bj − bN−1)
(r + δ)κ =
(
1− δ
r + δ
)
ΛN
∑
j 6=N
ΠNj(bj − bN ).
Next note that any solution to the preceding system entails κ = 0 since the right-hand side of
the first equation is nonpositive while the right-hand side of the last equation is nonnegative. It
follows that any candidate solution to the system entails Λ1 = ΛN = 0. Further, it must be the
case that for intermediate states, either Λi = 0 or the expected change in the benefit flow is zero.
H. Proof of Proposition 11
The program is
max
{st}
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(
1
1 + r
)τ
{bt+τ−1F (st+τ−1)− [pt+τst+τ − (1− δ)st+τ−1]}.
The first-order condition with respect to st is
(
1
1 + r
)
btF
′(st) = Ut ≡ pt −
(
1− δ
1 + r
)
Et[pt+1].
Thus, the optimal stock is
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s∗t = [F
′]−1[(1 + r)Ut/bt].
I. Solution to Model with Quadratic Adjustment Costs and Concave Profits
The program is
max
{st}
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(
1
1 + r
)τ



bt+τ−1F (st+τ−1)− pt+τ [st+τ − (1− δ)st+τ−1]
− ξ−12 [st+τ − (1− δ)st+τ−1]
2


 .
The first-order condition with respect to st is
(
1
1 + r
)
btF
′(st)− pt − ξ−1at +
(
1− δ
1 + r
)
Et
[
pt+1 + ξ
−1at+1
]
= 0.
The optimal accumulation policy is
at = ξ
[
btF
′(st)
1 + r
− Ut
]
+
(
1− δ
1 + r
)
Et [at+1] .
Iterating and applying the law of iterated expectations, we have
Et[at+1] = ξEt
[(
bt+1F
′(st+1)
1 + r
− Ut+1
)]
+
(
1− δ
1 + r
)
Et [at+2] .
Substituting back into the accumulation equation, we obtain
at = ξ
[
btF
′(st)
1 + r
− Ut +
(
1− δ
1 + r
)
Et
(
bt+1F
′(st+1)
1 + r
− Ut+1
)]
+
(
1− δ
1 + r
)
Et [at+2] .
Continuing to iterate in this fashion, we obtain
at = ξ
∞∑
τ=0
(
1− δ
1 + r
)τ
Et
[
bt+τF
′(st+τ )
1 + r
− Ut+τ
]
.
Next note that
∞∑
τ=0
(
1− δ
1 + r
)τ
Et [Ut+τ ] = pt.
It follows that
at = ξ
[(
1
1 + r
)( ∞∑
τ=0
(
1− δ
1 + r
)τ
Et[bt+τF ′(st+τ )]
)
− pt
]
.
45
A
cc
ep
te
d
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
J. Solution to Model with Stock-Dependent Adjustment Costs and Concave Profits
The program is
max
{st}
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(
1
1 + r
)τ

 bt+τF (st+τ )− pt+τ [st+τ − (1− δ)st+τ−1]
−γ2 [st+τ − (1− δ)st+τ−1]
2 s−1t+τ−1

 .
Letting α ≡ a/s, the first-order condition for st is
pt + γαt = btF
′(st) +
(
1
1 + r
)
Et
[
(1− δ)pt+1 + (1− δ)γαt+1 +
γ
2
α2t+1
]
.
Rearranging terms, the optimal accumulation rate can be expressed in terms of the user cost of
capital U :
αt =
1
γ
[
btF
′(st)− Ut
]
+
1
2(1− δ)
(
1− δ
1 + r
)
Et
[
α2t+1
]
+
(
1− δ
1 + r
)
Et [αt+1] .
Iterating on the accumulation equation and applying the law of iterated expectations, we have
Et[αt+1] =
1
γ
Et
[
bt+1F
′(st+1)− Ut+1
]
+
1
2(1− δ)
(
1− δ
1 + r
)
Et
[
α2t+2
]
+
(
1− δ
1 + r
)
Et [αt+2] .
Substituting this term into the optimality condition, we obtain
αt =
1
γ
Et


[btF
′(st)− Ut] +
(
1−δ
1+r
)
[bt+1F
′(st+1)− Ut+1]
γ
2(1−δ)
((
1−δ
1+r
)
Et
[
α2t+1
]
+
(
1−δ
1+r
)2
Et
[
α2t+2
])


+
(
1− δ
1 + r
)2
Et [αt+2] .
Iterating in this fashion, we obtain
αt =
1
γ
[ ∞∑
τ=0
(
1− δ
1 + r
)τ
Et
(
bt+τF
′(st+τ )− Ut+τ +
1
1 + r
γ
2
α2t+τ+1
)]
.
Canceling the offsetting terms involving the user cost of capital, the optimal accumulation policy
is
αt =
1
γ
[( ∞∑
τ=0
(
1− δ
1 + r
)τ
Et
{
bt+τF
′(st+τ ) +
1
1 + r
γ
2
α2t+τ+1
})
− pt
]
.
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Table I 
Shock Responses in Economy with Decreasing Tax Rates 
The table shows the model-implied change in accumulation associated with a 5 percentage point 
change in the tax rate to one of its nearest neighboring tax rates. The assumed probability of a 5 
percentage point tax rate decrease is 15% and the assumed probability of a 5 percentage point tax 
rate increase is 5%. The assumed risk-free rate is 2.5% and the assumed depreciation rate is 7.25%. 
Initial Tax Rate Transition Down Transition Up 
0% NA -0.236 
5% 0.236 -0.364 
10% 0.364 -0.432 
15% 0.432 -0.470 
20% 0.470 -0.489 
25% 0.489 -0.500 
30% 0.500 -0.503 
35% 0.503 -0.493 
40% 0.493 -0.419 
45% 0.419 NA 
 
 
 
Table II 
Shock Responses in Economy with Mean-Reverting Tax Rates 
The table shows the model-implied change in accumulation associated with a 5 percentage point 
change in the tax rate to one of its nearest neighboring tax rates. For tax rates no greater than 20%, 
the probability of a tax rate increase is 15% and the probability of a tax rate decrease is 5%. For tax 
rates greater than 20%, the probability of a tax rate increase is 5% and the probability of a tax rate 
decrease is 15%. The assumed risk-free rate is 2.5% and the assumed depreciation rate is 7.25%. 
Initial Tax Rate Transition Down Transition Up 
0% NA -0.398 
5% 0.398 -0.451 
10% 0.451 -0.425 
15% 0.425 -0.355 
20% 0.355 -0.221 
25% 0.221 -0.355 
30% 0.355 -0.425 
35% 0.425 -0.451 
40% 0.451 -0.398 
45% 0.398 NA 
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Table III 
Estimated Tax Transition Rates 
The table shows the discrete state-space approximation for the estimated tax rate autoregressive 
process. The entries show the probability of a transition from a given rate to a given rate. Panel A 
assumes three possible tax rates and Panel B assumes four possible tax rates. The assumed risk-
free rate is 2.5% and the assumed depreciation rate is 7.25%. 
 Panel A. Three Possible Tax Rates  
   To     
  From 35.5% 50.4% 62.7%   
  35.5% 85.84% 14.13% 0.02%   
 50.4% 12.24% 75.51% 12.24%   
  62.7% 0.02% 14.13% 85.85%   
        
  Panel B. Four Possible Tax Rates  
  To    
  From 33.3% 45.9% 54.9% 67.4% 
  33.3% 83.0% 16.8% 0.2% 0.0% 
 45.9% 13.5% 67.4% 19.0% 0.2% 
  54.9% 0.2% 19.0% 67.4% 13.5% 
  67.4% 0.0% 0.2% 16.8% 83.0% 
 
Table IV 
Ratio of Shock Response to Causal Effects 
The table shows the model-implied ratio of shock response to causal effect based upon the estimated 
tax transition rates shown in Table III. Panel A assumes three possible tax rates and Panel B 
assumes four possible tax rates. The assumed risk-free rate is 2.5% and the assumed depreciation 
rate is 7.25%. 
 
 Panel A. Three Possible Tax Rates  
   To     
  From 35.5% 50.4% 62.7%   
  35.5% NA 0.425 0.426   
 50.4% 0.425 NA 0.427   
  62.7% 0.426 0.427 NA   
        
  Panel B. Four Possible Tax Rates  
  To    
  From 33.3% 45.9% 54.9% 67.4% 
  33.3% NA 0.440 0.485 0.478 
 45.9% 0.440 NA 0.548 0.487 
  54.9% 0.485 0.548 NA 0.443 
  67.4% 0.478 0.487 0.443 NA 
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Figure 1. Ratio of shock response to causal effect. The figure shows the model-implied ratio of shock 
response to causal effect with a 20% permanent shock probability drawn from a uniform distribution 
on the support from -0.15 to 0.85. The assumed risk-free rate is 2.5%. 
 
